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Introduction. In decision science it is usually assumed that a decision maker, when choosing between alternatives, maximizes a quantitative functional, satisfying certain desirable properties. Often the functional is assumed to be an integral. In decision theory the integral of a utility function may be taken in an expected utility criterion, in statistics the integral of the negative of a loss function leads to the minimization of expected loss. In dynamic contexts the integral of income over the time axis is taken, with a density function representing discounting. The assumption of maximization of a quantitative functional is made operational by behavioral foundations, i.e., (decision-theoretic) representation theorems. These take preferences (binary choices) between alternatives as observable primitives, and give necessary and sufficient conditions ("characterizations") for the preferences to maximize a functional of the desired kind. Obviously, this requires a "translation" of the desired conditions of the functionals to be maximized into conditions for the preferences, and vice-versa. Hence conditions for integrals must be found that are suited for such a translation.
For the continuation of this introduction some terminology must be introduced, and the organization of the paper must be sketched; see Figure 1 . Results are given for five approaches. In each of these the term alternative is used. The first approach, the "functional approach," appears in ?1. Here functionals on a set of (alternatives =) functions to R are taken as primitives, and characterized as integrals. The obtained results will be used in the other approaches. In these other approaches binary preferences are taken as primitives, and those representable by integrals are characterized. Section 2 presents three approaches, each dealing with decision making Results in the literature which can be extended by the techniques of this paper, but will not be discussed in the sequel, include de Finetti (1937, 1972, 1974 ), Koopmans (1972; our approach allows for discrete time as well as continuous time or mixed cases), Mak (1987, for infinitely many components), and Weibull (1985; truncationcontinuity characterizes the set L1 without assuming, as Weibull does, utility to be known).
Similarly to the extension of Savage's (1954) result, the results of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and Wakker (1989b) are extended below. In the latter two no restriction is imposed on the state space. It may be finite, infinite, a continuum, and may or may not contain atoms. Also the result of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) for DMUR will be extended. The models of Savage and Anscombe and Aumann have not yet been extended to unbounded utility functions in the literature. For the result of von Neumann and Morgenstern several contributions have been made; nevertheless the generality provided by truncation-continuity in Theorem 3.6 has not been attained before.
Theorems 2.9 and 2.13, and Corollary 4.5 deal with generalizations of expected utility. While the axioms of Savage make subjective expected utility operational, they (primarily the sure-thing principle) are nowadays mostly taken to show that subjective expected utility has too many drawbacks. This was discussed in the early Allais (1953) . The most influential result in the recent literature to deviate from expected utility has been Machina (1982) . There expected utility was deprived of its most celebrated results, the results on risk aversion of Pratt and Arrow and the results on stochastic dominance. Machina showed that these results, extended in a natural way, hold in the general (differentiable) case, without needing the assumption of expected utility maximization. See also the survey in Machina (1987) and Fishburn (1988) , for recent deviations from expected utility. Another impulse for the deviation from expected utility stems from the recent developments in artificial intelligence. The prevailing view is that subjective probabilities are too restricted and intractable to describe reasoning with uncertainty, or for the updating of knowledge. See for instance the discussion in Statistical Science (1987, 2, no. 1), or Wakker (1990c) . Hence, besides expected utility, this paper considers the generalization of subjective expected utility called Choquet expected utility, as initiated by Schmeidler (1989; first version 1982) . Here probabilities are allowed to be nonadditive, which may express vagueness about the values of the probabilities, and optimism/pessimism. Integration is done by means of the Choquet integral. As a corollary of these results, Subsection 4.2 extends Quiggin's (1982) rank-dependent utility to unbounded probability distributions.
In ?4 countable additivity, uniqueness results, and necessity of conditions are discussed. The motivation to bring together representation results for several different approaches into one paper, rather than present them separately, is to bring to the fore their unity. This is sketched in Subsection 4.6. For that reason the similar intermediate steps will be made explicit in the analyses. Subsections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, ?3, and Subsection 4.2, dealing with five different approaches to representations of preferences, can be read independently of each other. If a (sub)section uses definitions given before, mention will be made in that (sub)section. Also all main results are formulated so as to be immediately accessible without consultation of the text, other than for definitions. These main results are Theorems 1.12, 1.13, 1.15, 2.5, 2.9, 2.13, 2.17, 3.6, as well as Corollaries 2.10, 2.14, and 4.5.
Properties of integrals.
This section deals with the functional approach, and studies properties of functionals which are (Choquet) integrals. Alternatives, the arguments of the functionals, are functions. 449 1.1. Introduction. The characterizations of integral representations in this paper reflect the definitions of integrals with respect to bounded measures. The start is with a measure, or, equivalently, with the integral of indicator functions, subsequently extended to all linear combinations of indicator functions (i.e., step functions). This paper concentrates on subsequent technical stages, where integral representations are extended to functions with infinitely many values. For such functions the integral can be defined as the limit of integrals of step functions that approximate the function in an appropriate manner.
This leads, in the second stage, to a well-defined real value whenever the function is bounded. Bounded functions can be enclosed from above and below by step functions, resulting in upper and lower sums which in the limit uniquely enclose the value of the integral. The exact way of constructing the enclosing step functions varies from context to context. In most contexts the range is "rich", i.e., an interval; then the enclosing step functions can be dominating/dominated "pointwise", i.e., for every argument. This is the usual procedure for defining integrals. In some contexts in this paper however, not the range, but the domain is "rich". Then the range of the measure is convex and the enclosing step functions are taken, somewhat more complicated, "conditionally dominating/dominated".
For unbounded functions complications occur. Integrals can be plus or minus infinity, or, which is the more difficult problem, they can be undefined if both tails are too dense. The third and final stage of the extension includes the functions that are unbounded but still have a well-defined and finite integral. The characteristic feature of such functions is that for each positive E a "truncation from above" of the function can be made such that the integral above the truncation is smaller than E (see Figure  3) , with similar observations for truncation from below. This condition can be translated into a condition for preference relations, truncation-continuity, introduced in Wakker (1989b) for the context of subjective expected utility. The condition has not appeared elsewhere in the literature. Still I think it is the natural translation of the above characteristic feature. The aim of this paper is to show that this condition gives a simple and general tool to characterize integral representations for unbounded functions in many contexts.
The extension of preferences to functions with infinite and unbounded integrals is a topic for future research. In DMUU the only attempt along these lines known to us is Toulet (1986) . Many open problems remain in her paper, however, such as how to define formally "may be compared" in Axiom l(iv) while having correctness of Propositions 4 and 10, how to deal with the case where utility is both unbounded from above and below, and how to define preferences such as in Counterexample 5.1 while preserving conditions such as transitivity. The take-over criterion from economic growth theory, considering the integral of differences rather than the difference of integrals (see for instance von Weizsacker 1965) seems better suited.
The results in this section are given for general nonadditive measures (capacities). A reader interested only in (integrals with respect to) additive measures may simply keep in mind throughout the sequel the special case that the capacities v are additive, i.e., are probability measures, and that the Choquet integrals are regular integrals. The reader need only observe then that (1.1) below is an alternative way to define additive integrals.
In the functional-analysis-literature it is usually assumed that the domain of a functional is a linear space of functions. In representations of preferences, however, the domain of the functional is usually not closed under addition and/or multiplication. Hence integrals must be characterized on more general domains. Given an algebra v on a set fl, the set of step functions, denoted s,S is the set of functions from 1l to an interval I that are linear combinations of the indicator-functions of 450 UNBOUNDED UTILITY FOR SAVAGE S 'FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS elements of d. The only restriction imposed on F below is that it contain all step functions.
Step functions meet no measurability problems. They are measurable whatever algebra is imposed on the range, and so are their sums and mixtures. Hence, many conditions will be restricted to FS below. Obviously, F-is a subset of the set of measurable simple functions (i.e., functions with finite range) from fl to I. In the functional approach of this section the algebra . on I is assumed to contain all one-point subsets; then 5F is identical to the set of measurable simple functions. So we assume throughout this section: ASSUMPTION 1.1. (Functional Assumption). fl is a nonempty set and S is an algebra of subsets of 1S. I c R is a nondegenerate interval and . is an algebra of subsets of I containing all intervals. F is a set of measurable functions from fl to I, containing -s. V is a function from SF to 1R. o
The above assumption describes the functional approach. Note that the measurability assumptions are the usual ones if 9 is the Borel-o--algebra and v is a cr-algebra. The more general approach of this paper, including (non-a-) algebras, calls for some caution. For example, the sum of two measurable functions may be nonmeasurable. Because this has sometimes been overlooked in the literature, an example is given. Another example for a somewhat different context has been given in Fishburn (1982, ?10.2). The sum/mixture of step functions is always measurable. This is one reason for restricting conditions to step functions. Then (f~,-)m= is a sequence of step functions, approximating f uniformly from below, and (f'+)m= is a sequence of step functions approximating f uniformly from above.
Next let (ff's-)j be an arbitrary sequence of step functions approximating f uniformly from below (from above is similar, and will not be elaborated). We may assume that, for all j, At this stage an analogue of Lemma 1.5 could be formulated, with pointwise monotonicity replaced by a condition for functionals that might be called conditional monotonicity. I think however that for its own sake the condition is not very natural for functionals; hence I abstain from making it explicit. It will be implicit in Savage's approach to DMUU, and in the DMUR approach. Kelley (1955) or Wakker (1989b)) on N \ {1}, containing no finite set. Let P be a probability measure assigning probability 1/2 to {1} and probability 1/2 to every subset of N in '. Obviously, P is not countably additive. One may think of P as assigning probability 1/2 to two atoms, {1}, and an "invisible atom at infinity" described by %C. Let 
1/2. V is not identical to the Choquet integral. o
For functions that are bounded from one side, a continuity condition could be imposed in the spirit of truncation-continuity as defined below, but with truncations replaced by pointwise dominating, or dominated, step functions. Thus Choquet integrals could be characterized. However, if a function f is unbounded from both sides, then no step function will dominate it pointwise, or be dominated pointwise, and approximations as in (1.11) and (1.12) cannot be invoked to identify the Choquet integral. For these functions an alternative method must be used. For the additive Lebesgue integral, where the integrals of functions bounded from one side are defined through (1.11) and (1.12), the integrals of functions f that are unbounded from both sides are traditionally defined as the sum of the integrals of f := f 0 and f-=: f 0?, whenever this sum is defined. Such an approach could also be used for the definition of the Choquet integral. It is however, to the best of my knowledge, not suited for the purpose of this paper, where properties of integrals are to be "translated" into conditions in terms of the preferences represented by the integrals. V(f) = V(fS).
[ As constant functions are special cases of step functions, the above condition is indeed implied by, so less restrictive than, the assumption that certainty equivalents exist. In the presence of convexity of I, and continuity of V on Fs as implied by the other conditions in all main results below, the two conditions are actually equivalent (the certainty equivalent is between the maximum and minimum of the step equivalent).
Step equivalence serves to exclude infinitesimal differences between equivalence classes. As truncation-continuity, it can as well serve to exclude, in the presence of the other conditions, functions with integral value plus or minus infinity. Actually, such functions do not pose serious problems for representation theorems. The functions that are really problematic are those that are unbounded from both sides, and have an undefined integral; i.e., their positive part gives integral plus infinity, their negative part minus infinity. These functions can satisfy the step equivalent assumption, as well as the other usual decision-theoretic assumptions. Only to discard these, the full strength of truncation-continuity is needed. (1) > is a weak order on -, (2) a is pointwise monotonic, (1) a is a weak order on -, (2) a is s-vNM-continuous, (3) a is s-comonotonic independent, (4) a is pointwise monotonic, (5) a satisfies the step equivalent assumption, (6) a is truncation-continuous.
PROOF. As shown in Schmeidler (1989), or Wakker (1990c, Theorem 6), Conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4) imply the representation on 9-s. EU(e) being a nondegenerate interval, Theorem 2.5 now gives the desired result. n Schmeidler (1989) considered the special case of the above theorem where y is the set of all bounded acts, and Conditions (2) and (3) are strengthened to hold for all these acts. On -b, Condition (6) is trivially satisfied, and Condition (5) is straightforwardly implied by the strengthening of s-continuity to all acts (leaving aside some measurability complications).
COROLLARY 2.10 (Extension of Anscombe and Aumann's (1963) SEU representation to unbounded acts). In the above theorem maximization of SEU holds if Condition (3) is strengthened to s-independence.
PROOF. Additivity of the capacity follows straightforwardly, e.g., by applying the theorem of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) to any fixed finite partition of fQ and the set of step acts measurable with respect to that partition. n The above corollary has extended the classical result of Anscombe and Aumann to infinite state spaces, and also to unbounded acts; that latter extension has not yet been provided in the literature. Fishburn (1982, Chapter 10) extends the result of Anscombe and Aumann to infinite state spaces, but assumes that Y contains all measurable acts (and even, to obtain a mixture space structure, mixtures of these that can be nonmeasurable). This implies boundedness (with probability one) of all acts in Y-, and boundedness of utility as soon as there is a denumerable partition of f with all elements having positive probability. The approach of this section is called the connected topology approach. The assumption of connectedness is crucial; the assumption of separability has been made for simplicity of presentation, and can nearly always be omitted. See Remark 4.8. The motivation for the approach of this subsection is as follows. As compared to Savage's approach, the continuity assumption (Condition (6) in Theorem 2.17) requiring fineness of the state space is replaced by continuity requiring fineness of the consequence space. The latter assumption is satisfied anyhow in many analyses. As compared to the A&A approach, we do not require all simple objective probability distributions over prizes to be available as consequences. These objective probability distributions over prizes are to be dealt with in a linear way, i.e., as in EU (see the A&A Assumption 2.6), in the A&A approach. Relaxing this requirement is particularly desirable in nonadditive contexts. This subsection generalizes the approaches of de Finetti to continuous instead of linear utility, and of course to more general consequence spaces than R. Linearity of utility is generally considered to be too restrictive. The price to pay for the great generality is that the characterizing conditions are more complicated than those in the previous subsection. The presentation below will be concise. are closed with respect to the product topology on em. This s-continuity is of a finite-dimensional character, thus is weaker than most of the other continuity conditions used in the literature. It is weaker than continuity of a with respect to the (restriction of the) product topology, and also weaker than the sup-metric continuity as used in Koopmans (1972) . Also the step equivalent assumption can be seen to be implied by product-topology-continuity, and by Koopmans' sup-metric-continuity. (1) > is a weak order on , (2) a is s-continuous, (1989b) . The latter is given as a corollary. In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss some details. One difference is that Wakker (1989b) used a constant-continuity condition instead of the present step equivalence assumption. The only implication of constant-continuity was, however, the existence of certainty equivalents, as derived in Lemma V.4.4 there (also straightforwardly implied by step equivalence, s-continuity, and connectedness). The second difference is that Wakker (1989b) assumed that 9 contains all open subsets, instead of the present assumption that _ contain all preference intervals; the latter can be seen to be somewhat less restrictive. COROLLARY 2.14 (Extension of Wakker's (1989b) SEU representation to unbounded acts). In the above theorem a maximizes SEU if comonotonic tradeoff consistency is strengthened to tradeoff consistency. D Necessary and sufficient conditions for a representation as above (also using a connected topology; compare Remark 4.8) are given in Grodal (1978) . Her condition that the set of acts is a "mixture" and that all constant acts should be available implies truncation-closedness, and the availability of all step acts. Her condition of continuity with respect to nullsets implies countable additivity of the probability measure and truncation-continuity; see Subsection 4.1. Her main characterizing condition (instead of tradeoff consistency) requires "independence" of a mean groupoid operation on the set of consequences, derived from the preference relation, and using continuity for its definition. It has the disadvantage of not being elementary in terms of preferences, hence not being directly testable. 2.4. Savage's approach to DMUU, with an infinitely divisible state space. This subsection shows how to use truncation-continuity to extend the famous result of Savage (1954) to the case of unbounded utility. The approach of this subsection is called Savage's approach, and is characterized mainly by Condition (6) in Theorem 2.17, imposing restrictions upon the state space. A nonadditive generalization of Savage's model is very complicated; it has been obtained in Gilboa (1987) . There the sure-thing principle no longer holds, and conditional preferences, as used below, can no longer be defined. So there Gilboa's axiom P7*, by itself logically independent of Savage's P7, would have to be generalized in the same spirit as Savage's P7 is generalized below. This paper, however, will follow Savage's setup as closely as possible, to obtain a direct generalization thereof. Hence the nonadditive generalization of Savage's model is not studied here.
Truncation-continuity is used again to exclude acts with unbounded or (more importantly) undefined SEU. The main difference as compared to the setups considered so far is that not the consequence space, but the state space satisfies a fineness restriction. For that reason the restrictive conditions of continuity of utility are, loosely speaking, replaced by a continuity condition for probability.
The notation f_Aa from Subsection 2.3 is also used in this subsection, as is the definition of essentiality of events, and the convention that elements of partitions are 467 events. Some further preparatory notations are given. For f, g: fl -> -, A E d, fA is the restriction of f to A, and g-AfA is identical to f on A and to g on Ac. Let us recall that, for any fixed w E Sl, g_Af(o) is equal to g on AC and to the constant f(t) on A.
The sure-thing principle, Savage's (1954) most famous condition, is given in the version as it is usually taken nowadays; i.e., it entails only Savage's P2. (Savage himself also included his P3, i.e., Condition (3) in Theorem 2.17, in the term sure-thing principle.) It says that a preference between two acts should only depend on the states of nature at which the acts are different. It is straightforwardly verified that this is a necessary condition for SEU maximization, and that it is implied in Corollaries 2.10 and 2.14. Many related independence-conditions from other decision theories have been listed in Wakker (1989b, ?11.5). As throughout this paper, conditions are restricted to FS as much as possible; this also holds for the sure-thing principle. It can be seen that the conditions in Theorem 2.17, with the sure-thing principle restricted to step acts, imply the sure-thing principle for all acts. DEFINITION 2.15. We say that a satisfies the sure-thing principle if
Vff, g, s, t E F, A E -V) f _ASA, g-ASA, f_AtA, g-AtA E = f: f-ASA a g-ASA ** f-AtA > g-AtA.
We say > satisfies the s(tep)-sure-thing principle if the above is required only on Fs.
In the presence of the s-sure-thing principle the following definitions are useful. We say that > satisfies above-truncation-continuity if (2.2a) holds for all f E E. Next we prove (without using truncation-continuity in full force):
(2.12) if > satisfies above-truncation-continuity, then for all f E : f(uo f) dP is well defined and V(f) < (u of) dP.
We first show that f(u o f) dP is well defined. Suppose it were undefined. Let f -f for fS E 9S. Because (u o f) dP is undefined, u(e) is unbounded from below (in fact from both sides) so gS E F5 can be found with gS -< f, i.e., gS -< f. By above-truncation-continuity, gS < f ^ K for some /t. Contradiction follows from The theorem follows from (2.12) and (2.14). a I think the above result shows that boundedness of utility, as implied in Savage's model, is not a consequence of mainly his postulates P6 (Condition (6) above) and/or P7 (conditional monotonicity). Each of these postulates, as well as all other postulates of Savage, hold in the above theorem. I prefer to ascribe boundedness of utility in Savage's setup to his assumption that the preference relation is defined (i.e., complete) over all acts (i.e., measurable functions from fl to e), thus under unbounded utility also for the acts having infinite or undefined expected utility. Note that, as a corollary of the above theorem, the used conditions do imply pointwise monotonicity.
3. DMUR, with probability distributions as alternatives. This section studies decision making under risk (DMUR), where alternatives are probability distributions over a set e, the consequence space. This setup should be distinguished from the A&A approach in Subsection 2.2. As compared to DMUU it assumes that an ("objective") probability distribution over fl is given. Then any act can be associated with the probability distribution over the consequences generated by the act, and the state space Qf can be forgotten. Results of DMUR and DMUU can be related by the techniques described in Wakker (1990a). Thus it can be seen that the results of this section and Subsection 2.4 are closely related. The same appears from the proof of Savage's theorem in Fishburn (1970) and Arrow (1971) . The definitions of weak order and representing function, or function to be maximized, from ?2 are also used in this section.
Note below that probability distributions are assumed to be finitely additive, not necessarily countably additive. The extension to nonadditive probability measures, with a setup as sketched in Jaffray (1989), meets complications like those for the nonadditive version of Savage's approach, and is not pursued here. A simple probability distribution has finite support. In this paper it is also called step-probability distribution, for unity of terminology. Note that .9 below is not supposed to be closed under mixing. Probability distributions which assign probability one to a single element of -are identified with the associated element of '; hence a below induces again a binary relation on e, also denoted as a . ASSUMPTION 3.1 (DMUR Assumption). -e is a nonempty set, endowed with an algebra . of subsets containing all one-point subsets. .9 is a set of probability 472 UNBOUNDED UTILITY FOR SAVAGE S "FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS" distributions on 9, containing the set 9is of all step probability distributions; a is a nontrivial binary relation on 9. For the induced binary relation a on -e, contains all preference intervals. a
The following condition adapts the s-sure-thing principle and s-independence from Definition 2.8 to the present setup. Because the definition below is the natural adaptation of Definition 2.16, the same term is used. Note that the probability measures Pi are not required to be contained in 9, and that the sets occurring below are preference intervals, hence measurable. In the context studied mostly in the literature, e.g., in Fishburn (1982, Chapter 3), 9 is rich and is closed under convex combinations; then the condition below can be restricted to the simpler case m = 1. Together with mainly independence required for all probability distributions instead of just for step-probability distributions, and richness of .9, it then straightforwardly implies the condition below. Also note that all preferences in antecedents are between step-probability distributions. It is elementarily verified that in the theorem below the conditions of s-independence and s-vNM-continuity, do imply the same conditions for all probability distributions in the presence of the other conditions. EU(P) denotes the expectation of a measurable function u: --R under probability measure P; it is infinite respectively undefined if the expectation is.
Similarly to previous definitions, for P E 9 and A e 4 , P A , the above truncation of P at /t, is as P on {a E -': a sx } \ {It}, and assigns all remaining probability P({L}) + P({a E -': a >-u}) to ,. So PA^({a E -e: a>-) = 0. In words, all probability mass from {a -': a >-/} is shifted to jI. Similarly, for v e 4, P v , the below truncation of P at v, shifts all probability mass from {a e -: a -< v} to v. We call a truncation-continuous if every P E 4 is truncation-robust. In Theorem 3.6 below, truncation-continuity will imply weak truncation-closedness, i.e., VP e 9, A, v E e 3ju' >, , v' < v such that P A l, P Vv' E 0. The conditions in the literature most similar to truncation-continuity may be Axioms A5 and A5* in Fishburn (1982, ??3.2 and 3.3) . Axiom A5 is, like truncation-continuity, necessary and sufficient for the EU contribution of upper and lower tails of probability distributions to tend to zero; thus it is also necessary and sufficient for finiteness of EU. It is, however, more complicated and uses (and requires available) several conditional probability distributions, and the results of "gluings-together" of these. More in the spirit of truncation-continuity is Fishburn's axiom A5*, with comparable simplicity. However, as indicated by Fishburn, his axiom A5* is necessary and sufficient for finiteness of EU only if the probability distributions are countably additive, not if they are finitely additive. The main difference between Fishburn's latter axiom and ours, and between Fishburn's definition of above (or, similarly, below) truncation and ours is, loosely speaking, as follows. We assign the probability mass taken from above the level of truncation entirely to that level of truncation, whereas Fishburn spreads that probability mass evenly over the remaining consequences. This is done by taking the conditional distribution given the event that the obtained consequence does not exceed the level of truncation. Fishburn's truncation is more drastic, leading to a more restrictive continuity condition. Even more drastic is the amputating as used by de Finetti (1974), assigning, with -= R+, for above truncations, all truncated probability mass to 0. Next we discuss approaches to DMUR where the outcome set is rich, and utility has an interval as range. Let us consider the Menger (1934) version of the St. Petersburg paradox, where the utility function is assumed unbounded from above, with connected range. A lottery is evaluated that yields utility 2k if after k tosses of a coin for the first time heads comes up, so has infinite expected utility. It has been observed several times that infinity of expected utility corresponds with divergence, to infinity, of the certainty equivalents of truncations of the lottery in question; truncation is obtained here by stopping after a finite number of tosses of the coin. See for instance Arrow (1971, p. 23), or Samuelson (1977, p. 34). Also Chew and Epstein (1989, end of ?4) consider certainty equivalents of truncations, and convergence of these to a real number. They formulate this condition for general lotteries, and for theories that generalize expected utility, but do not make explicit their method of truncation (denoted FK ). Addition of the certainty equivalent condition and truncation continuity completes their idea. At the very end of ?4 they suggest that completeness of preferences over unbounded probability measures must probably be abandoned. The following example illustrates some of the conditions discussed above: and .9 is the usual Borel a-algebra. 59 contains all finitely additive probability measures on 9; they obviously have finite expectation. Suppose a maximizes EU. Let P be any step-probability distribution such that EU(P) = 3/4, say P assigns probability 1 to {3/4}. Let Q be a discrete probability measure which assigns probability 1 to {1/n: n E N}, probability 1/2 to {1}, and probability 0 to every finite subset of {l/n: n > 2}; Q can for instance be generated by the act f' in Example 1.7. Obviously, Q is not countably additive; EU(Q) = 1/2, and P -Q. ,9 is truncation-
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closed, hence, as claimed at the beginning of Subsection 4.4, > satisfies truncationcontinuity. Indeed, the EU values of below truncations of Q tend to 1/2 and, e.g., for any , > 3/4, v < 1/2, P >-Q . However, for any v E ]0, 1[, the conditional distribution of P on ]v, 1] assigns probability 1 to 1, so Q is preferred to none of these and Fishburn's analogue of truncation-continuity is not satisfied; it is not a necessary condition for EU maximization. o[ THEOREM 3.6 (unbounded utility for probability distributions). Under the DMUR Assumption 3.1, , maximizes EU with respect to a utility function u: --[R (with all integrals finite) whenever the following six conditions are satisfied:
(1) a is a weak order on 9s, (2) > satisfies s-independence, (3) a satisfies s-vNM-continuity, (4) > is conditionally monotonic, (5) > satisfies the step equivalent assumption, (6) a is truncation-continuous.
PROOF. It is well known that Conditions (1) (when restricted to Ys), (2) and (3) are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a function u: --*> R such that a maximizes EU with respect to u on 5s. Let P E SJ.. All Ps equivalent to P have the same EU value, hence we can define the representing V(P) = EU(Ps) for any such Ps. It remains to prove that V(P) = EU(P). The following is an immediate consequence of conditional monotonicity, applied twice, with m = 1: (3.2) VP e ~,, a E -: P({3 e -f: /f -a}) = 1 P ~ a.
P is bounded (from) below if 3v E {: P({a e E : a > v}) = 1; then v is a lower bound of P. P is bounded (from) above if 3A E ': P({a e {: ,/L , a}) = 1; then /L is an upper bound of P. P is bounded if it is both bounded from above and below. gb denotes the set of all probability distributions in ? that are bounded. We first show: (3.3) P E b = V(P) = EU(P).
Suppose v is a lower bound and / is an upper bound for P. Note that EU(P) is well defined and is contained in [u(v), u(,u)], so is finite. We tightly enclose P by step probability distributions; these will not be pointwise By boundedness from above, EU(P) in (3.5) is well defined but might in general be -oo; the above inequality shows, however, that EU(P) is finite. We say that a satisfies above-truncation-continuity if (3.la) holds for all P e D. We prove next (without using truncation-continuity in full force): (3.6) if a satisfies above-truncation-continuity, then for all P E 9:
EU(P) is well defined and V(P) < EU(P).
We first show that EU(P) is well defined. Suppose it were undefined. Let P -Ps for ps E 5S. EU(P) being undefined, u(-) is unbounded from below (in fact from both sides) so Qs E Ds can be found with QS -< PS, i.e., QS -< P. By above-truncationcontinuity, QS < P 'A for some uL. Contradiction follows from -oo < V(Q) < V(P ^) < EU(P A) = -oo, where the weak inequality follows from (3.5), the equality because EU(P) is undefined. So EU(P) is well defined. Suppose, for contradiction, V(P)> EU(P). Because EU(P) > inf(u(-)), [3a E / : u(a) < (P)]. Mix a with Rs (Rs E 9s, RS -P) to obtain PS E gs such that V(P) > V(Ps) > EU(P). By above-truncation-continuity, there is an above truncation P A A such that still V/(P A ) > V(PS) = EU(Ps) > EU(P).
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(3.7)
